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Abstract
Privacy-aware search of outsourced data ensures relevant data access in the untrusted
domain of a public cloud service provider. Subscriber of a public cloud storage service
can determine the presence or absence of a particular keyword by submitting search
query in the form of a trapdoor. However, these trapdoor-based search queries are
limited in functionality and cannot be used to identify secure outsourced data which
contains semantically equivalent information. In addition, trapdoor-based
methodologies are confined to pre-defined trapdoors and prevent subscribers from
searching outsourced data with arbitrarily defined search criteria. To solve the problem
of relevant data access, we have proposed an index-based privacy-aware search
methodology that ensures semantic retrieval of data from an untrusted domain. This
method ensures oblivious execution of a search query and leverages authorized
subscribers to model conjunctive search queries without relying on predefined trapdoors.
A security analysis of our proposed methodology shows that, in a conspired attack,
unauthorized subscribers and untrusted cloud service providers cannot deduce any
information that can lead to the potential loss of data privacy. A computational time
analysis on commodity hardware demonstrates that our proposed methodology requires
moderate computational resources to model a privacy-aware search query and for its
oblivious evaluation on a cloud service provider.
Introduction 1
We are living through a post-PC era in which computing facilities are regarded as the 2
fifth utility [1]. These facilities, which are primarily related to computational and 3
storage services, are provisioned to subscribers on a pay-as-you-go basis. This new 4
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service provisioning model is known as cloud computing [2]. Advances in virtualization 5
technologies and the availability of high-speed Internet have fostered this on-demand 6
computing paradigm. It provides an abstraction of unlimited computational and storage 7
facilities to its subscribers, enabling them to dynamically scale services or applications 8
according to their specific requirements [3]. These on-demand and virtualized services 9
are provisioned by a cloud service provider (CSP). The underlying cloud infrastructure 10
(processing power, storage capacity, and networking facility) is owned, managed, and 11
operated by a CSP. Subscribers do not need to take care of the cloud infrastructure, the 12
assurance related to uninterrupted service provisioning is delineated in a service 13
contract that is signed between the CSP and its subscribers. 14
Cloud-based storage service is a generalization of cloud-enabled data sharing, 15
archiving, collaboration, and synchronization services [4]. These services leverage their 16
subscribers to store their data for much a longer duration without the concerns of data 17
availability and accessibility from varied devices, i.e., desktop computers, laptops, and 18
smartphones. As lucrative as it sounds, there are data privacy concerns when 19
confidential and personal data are outsourced to cloud-based storage services owned and 20
managed by a CSP [5], [6], [7], [8]. Since these services are provisioned beyond the 21
federated domain of subscribers over which they do not have any control, the CSP is 22
considered to be an untrusted entity [9]. The most obvious solution to ensure data 23
confidentiality in untrusted domain is to encrypt personal and confidential data before 24
it can be outsourced to a cloud-based storage service. Since these services are 25
provisioned on a pay-as-you-go basis, each data access request is charged according to 26
the amount of data transferred between the subscriber and the CSP. Thus, the 27
capability of a subscriber to access relevant encrypted data is very important. It ensures 28
data privacy and can also increase the utility of the cloud-based storage services. 29
To access relevant data within the untrusted domain of a CSP, two main 30
methodologies are employed, namely a search over encrypted data [10], [11], [12] and an 31
index-based data search [13], [14], [15]. A search over encrypted data exploits the 32
mathematical properties (trapdoors) of the cryptographic protocol to identify encrypted 33
data that contain a particular keyword. These methodologies ensure the privacy of the 34
outsourced data and the search query, preventing the CSP from deducing any 35
information about the outsourced data that can lead to a potential loss of privacy. An 36
index-based data search employs a different methodology than an encrypted data search. 37
Instead of executing a search query over encrypted data, the search query is evaluated 38
for the index (inverted index) associated with the outsourced data. Trusted entities can 39
be employed to persist the index and evaluating the search query. In contrast to that, 40
index can be stored in cloud storage in encrypted form along with the outsourced data 41
and concealed search queries can be used to search the cloud. 42
The aforementioned methodologies provide accessibility to relevant data and also 43
ensure data privacy. However, these methodologies are fairly limited in their 44
functionality and greatly affect the utility of cloud-based storage services. A search over 45
encrypted data can only search for predefined keywords for which trapdoors are defined, 46
and in the case of data sharing and collaborative services, these trapdoors are shared 47
among subscribers. In an index-based data search, where the index is used by a trusted 48
entity, the cloud storage is underutilized for only the outsourced data, whereas the 49
search queries that are handled by a trusted entity can only retrieve the data that have 50
an exact match between the search criterion and index entries. Similarly, when the 51
index is outsourced to cloud storage, the CSP can learn the access patterns of 52
subscribers and can deduce confidential information about the outsourced data and 53
subscribers. For instance, if the outsourced data of a patient is searched by a medical 54
doctor specializing in diabetes mellitus, this leads to a possibility that either the 55
outsourced data contains information regarding diabetes mellitus or that the patient is 56
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suffering from diabetes mellitus. 57
Considering the limitations of conventional methodologies to efficiently retrieve 58
outsourced data taking data privacy into consideration, there is a need for a searching 59
methodology that can achieve semantic data retrieval and for an oblivious data search. 60
Semantic data retrieval will ensure that relevant data can be discovered even if there is 61
no exact match between the outsourced data and the search criteria defined by a 62
subscriber. This will greatly increase the efficacy of the searching methodology in data 63
sharing and collaboration services where the exact contents of the outsourced data are 64
not known to participating subscribers, and only abstract ideas/concepts are 65
communicated between them. For example, the employees of an insurance company who 66
are collaborating on a task to define premium rates for next year’s insurance policy, do 67
not know the actual contents of the survey reports shared by their colleagues. However, 68
they want to determine if there are any surveys on viral diseases in a certain vicinity. 69
An oblivious search will lead to maximized utilization of the cloud infrastructure 70
without relying on a trusted third party and will enable the CSP to evaluate the 71
encrypted search queries. 72
In this research, we propose an privacy-aware content discovery methodology that 73
enables subscribers of a cloud storage service to locate relevant data contents without 74
using actual keywords from the outsourced data. It is an index-based privacy-aware 75
data searching methodology that does not rely on a trusted third party to evaluate the 76
search query. It realizes privacy-aware content discovery, which ensures that only 77
authorized subscribers are able to search the outsourced data. It also prevents the CSP 78
and unauthorized subscribers from learning the presence or absence of any keywords 79
and deducing information that can lead to a potential loss of privacy, encompassing the 80
outsourced data and the subscribers’ personal information. 81
With the proposed methodology of privacy-aware content discovery, we make the 82
following contributions in the area of cloud-based storage services: 83
• Privacy-aware search for encrypted data by utilizing semantic information to 84
identify similarities between search criteria and outsourced data. The search 85
criteria defined by a subscriber need not be exactly the same as in the outsourced 86
data. If there exists a semantic relation between the search criteria and 87
outsourced data, the relevant data contents can be retrieved; 88
• Privacy-aware data search without the need to share trapdoor information, and 89
authorized subscribers can define their own search criteria. Their ability to access 90
relevant data is not restricted to the information communicated by the data owner 91
who outsources the data to the cloud storage; 92
• Maximized utilization of cloud storage services by persisting encrypted index and 93
evaluated encrypted search queries within the domain of untrusted CSP; and 94
• Index and search query expansion by using semantic technologies to realize an 95
encrypted data search similar to data contents for searching over the Internet. 96
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the related work. 97
Section 3 defines the system design goals and the architectural and security model along 98
with the assumptions. Section 4 is dedicated to the descriptive details of the proposed 99
methodology. Section 5 discusses the implementation details, followed by evaluation of 100
the results in Section 6. Section 7 presents the discussion on security, and Section 8 101
concludes the paper and discusses future directions. 102
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Related Work 103
In this section, we present methodologies to search encrypted data within an untrusted 104
domain. Throughout this section, we mainly focus on cryptosystems, which exploit the 105
mathematical properties of underlying cryptographic primitives to search encrypted 106
data (i.e., trapdoor functions), and enterprise products, which define their protocols to 107
match encrypted search queries and data. We mainly discuss the effects of these 108
conventional methodologies on the efficacy and utility of cloud-based storage services 109
within the context of data sharing and collaboration services. 110
Symmetric key cryptography (SKC) enables a search over encrypted data [10] by 111
utilizing a trapdoor defined for a particular key only to identify a match between a 112
search query (trapdoor function) and encrypted data. SKC has been used in various 113
schemes for searching over encrypted data, in which trapdoors are used to identify a 114
match between the index of encrypted keywords instead of encrypted 115
data [13], [14], [15]. However, the basic principles of the trapdoor’s definition and the 116
matching remain the same. A trapdoor-based search for public key cryptography (PKC) 117
was proposed by Boneh et al. [11]. It leverages an untrusted server to search encrypted 118
data using a public key, without the need to decipher concealed data. Schemes to search 119
encrypted data that are based on SKC and PKC are limited in functionality because 120
encrypted data can only be searched for keywords having corresponding trapdoors that 121
are defined by the data owner who encrypts the data. Also, these trapdoors must be 122
transmitted to authorized users, enabling them to access relevant data using search 123
queries. Thus, methodologies relying on trapdoor-based cryptography assume 124
guaranteed availability of the data owner or a trusted third party (TTP) to transmit a 125
trapdoor to authorized users according to their access privileges. 126
To search confidential personal healthcare records, Li et al. proposed the Authorized 127
Private Keyword Search (APKS) [12]. APKS utilizes Hierarchical Predicate Encryption 128
(HPE) to realize a search over encrypted data [16] and employs a TTP to distribute 129
capabilities (trapdoors) to authorized users according to their access privileges. These 130
capabilities are then submitted to the CSP to evaluate the search query. Wang et al. 131
proposed a methodology to rank search results according to their relevance with the 132
selection criteria (trapdoor) [17]. However, it only supports a single trapdoor-based 133
search query, greatly reducing its efficacy in defining the complex selection criterion and 134
lacking the realism to search a large amount of data. A Searchable Cryptographic Cloud 135
Storage System (CS2) focusing on dynamic data updates also provides a search over 136
encrypted data [18]. Instead of searching the entire encrypted data repository, CS2 137
utilized the inverted index. However, CS2 is limited to cloud-based storage services and 138
is not applied for cloud-based data sharing and collaboration services. Recently, Wenhai 139
Sun et al. presented a privacy-preserving multi-keyword text search (MTS) with 140
similarity-based ranking [19]. MTS utilizes tree-based indexing with adaption methods 141
for a multi-dimensional algorithm. It ensures the confidentiality of the search query and 142
the index data structure. However, it assumes that the user searching the cloud storage 143
always behaves honestly, whereas the cloud server is honest but curious. This 144
assumption can greatly affect the practicality of MTS for cloud-based storage services, 145
focusing on data sharing and collaboration, in which users can behave maliciously to 146
determine the presence or absence of a particular keyword(s). Oblivious Term Matching 147
(OTM) realizes an encrypted index search, where the index is computed over encrypted 148
outsourced data. OTM obliviously evaluates encrypted search queries, where it does not 149
consider relevant data access with consideration of semantic enrichment of the 150
encrypted index or search queries [20]. The proposed methodology of semantic data 151
search uses OTM to identify similarities between search criteria and outsourced data. 152
To achieve efficient data retrieval over large data contents, enterprises rely on search 153
products that are customized to their specific needs and requirements. The Google 154
PLOS 4/20
search appliance [21] and Windows enterprise search products [22] offer such search 155
solutions. These products create a searchable centralized enterprise-wide index that is 156
used within the enterprise’s data center or can be configured to use cloud repositories. 157
The search queries are evaluated and the results are filtered according to the access 158
privileges of a user. Since these products evaluate access privileges after the execution of 159
a search query, they require search services to be hosted within the federated domain of 160
an enterprise. Thus, these search services retrain the migration of an enterprise-to-cloud 161
ecosystem as it has to engage its own dedicated computation and storage resources for 162
customizable search services. The authors in [23] have shown that, by carefully modeling 163
search queries, malicious users can deduce confidential information from the centralized 164
index, even if their access privileges do not allow them to access encrypted data. 165
The aforementioned methodologies for searching encrypted data focus on the 166
confidentiality of the search query and the outsourced data. However, these 167
methodologies do not consider the privacy of the query evaluation process that is 168
employed to identify the relevant data contents. It can be exploited by a malicious CSP 169
to deduce information that can lead to a potential loss of privacy. In cloud-based data 170
sharing services, if multiple users are searching for a similar keyword, the CSP can 171
effortlessly identify the importance of the outsourced data and can concentrate its 172
malicious intents to deduce confidential information from the data. For instance, if the 173
employees from the accounts and planning departments of an organization are searching 174
data that has been outsourced to a folder called projected income statements, the CSP 175
can determine the irregularity in access patterns and consequently affect the highly 176
sensitive stock market, thereby disrupting the stock prices. Thus, a methodology that 177
can obliviously search cloud-based repositories is of great importance, as it restrains the 178
capability of a CSP to deduce or infer confidential information. 179
Fig 1 highlights the important features of existing methodologies for encrypted data 180
search i.e., availability requirement for involved entities, entity responsible for evaluating 181
the search query, and capability of a user to define arbitrary search queries. Although 182
these methodologies realize encrypted data search, however their functionality is limited 183
to exact matching between the search query and encrypted data i.e., trapdoors and 184
encrypted index. Also these methodologies restrain authorized users to define their own 185
search queries. In the subsequent sections, relevant data access with semantically 186
enriched search queries is presented. The proposed methodology realizes semantic 187
search enabling authorized users to define their own conjunctive search queries without 188
compromising privacy of the outsourced data and search queries as well. 189
Design Goals, System and Security Model, Main 190
Idea, Assumptions and Notations 191
System Design Goals 192
A data search within a cloud storage service allows subscribers to locate the required 193
data contents. However, when data is outsourced to an untrusted domain of a public 194
cloud service provider in encrypted form, standard search queries do not work, as the 195
search criteria cannot be mapped to encrypted data. These search queries can also 196
reveal confidential information about the outsourced data and the data owner. The 197
design goal of our proposed system is to allow the subscribers of a public cloud storage 198
service to search encrypted data in a similar way as contents are discovered over the 199
Internet. However, search queries should not reveal any information to the cloud service 200
provider, which can lead to the potential loss of privacy, affecting the outsourced data 201
and personal information. 202
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Fig 1. Features of conventional encrypted data search methodologies.
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System Model 203
To search encrypted data similar to content discovery works over the Internet, the 204
public cloud storage service provider, repository owner, and content contributor are 205
considered as the involved entities. For the sake of simplicity in the subsequent 206
descriptive details, we refer to these entities as the cloud server, owner, and subscriber, 207
respectively. The cloud server owns the cloud infrastructure (i.e., storage, computation, 208
and network) and provisions its access on a subscription basis. The owner is a cloud 209
storage subscriber who creates a shared repository that is accessible to other authorized 210
subscribers. Subscribers contribute to the shared repository by outsourcing data 211
contents. The owner and authorized subscribers search the cloud storage (shared 212
repository) by submitting search queries to the cloud server. Search queries are 213
obliviously evaluated by the cloud server, and the search results are provided to the 214
respective entity according to its access privileges. 215
Security Model 216
We consider the cloud server to be an untrusted entity that can collude with 217
unauthorized subscribers to compromise the privacy of the outsourced data. It can 218
assist unauthorized subscribers to search the outsourced data. Since the search query is 219
evaluated by the cloud server, its result can be exploited to deduce confidential 220
information about the outsourced data. To ensure the confidentiality of the outsourced 221
data, only encrypted data is outsourced to the cloud server. In addition, to prevent the 222
cloud server from inferring confidential information about the outsourced data, the 223
encrypted search query is obliviously evaluated. This restrains the cloud server and 224
unauthorized subscribers from learning of the presence or absence of a particular word 225
or concept in the outsourced data. 226
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Main Idea 227
Suppose the Daily News is a nationwide newspaper that provides coverage of national 228
and international events. Alice is a subeditor working for the Daily News. She oversees 229
the department that focuses on financial corruption. At any particular point in time, 230
she is working on multiple cases. She has assigned evidence collection and report 231
compilation tasks to her subordinate journalists. To deal with the problem of content 232
accessibility on her office and mobile devices, she has subscribed to a public cloud 233
storage service that is provisioned by Eve. Since her subordinate journalists share 234
confidential information with her, she does not want Eve to learn or deduce any 235
information about the outsourced data. To ensure the privacy of the data, each 236
journalist outsources encrypted data to the repository shared by Alice. 237
Bob and Mallory are Daily News journalists who work with Alice. Bob is an expert 238
at retrieving information from online resources. Mallory’s expertise is in finding the 239
ground truth by contacting the concerned authorities. Both are directed to submit their 240
findings on a financial scam that was recently exposed by the Fraud and Financial 241
Crime Division of the State. Alice has provisioned access to both Bob and Mallory to a 242
cloud-based shared repository. Bob retrieves all of the related information from online 243
resources, whereas Mallory compiles her report using the information she has collected 244
from the appropriate authorities. Before outsourcing their findings to a shared 245
repository, they index the information. The index is then further enhanced by 246
augmenting it with missing relevant information. After that, the findings and the 247
enhanced index are encrypted and outsourced to the shared repository. 248
Whenever Alice needs to search for a file containing particular information, she 249
defines a search criterion. The search criterion is then enriched by adding missing 250
relevant information. The augmented search criterion is then encrypted with the secret 251
key, and after that, Alice models an oblivious search query using the encrypted search 252
criterion. The oblivious query is then submitted to the cloud server, which replies with 253
the response. 254
Alice processes the cloud server response and determines the presence / absence of 255
keywords that were defined in the search criterion. From the processes of query 256
formation, evaluation, and post-processing of the result, the cloud server learns nothing 257
about the outsourced data or the search query; the search evaluation is oblivious to the 258
cloud server. If an unauthorized subscriber tries to search the repository, the proposed 259
system generates a randomized response. Fig 2 illustrates the conceptual model of our 260
proposed system for searching encrypted data in an untrusted domain. 261
Assumptions and Notations 262
The proposed system focuses on semantic search for encrypted data. We assume that 263
the owner has shared a symmetric encryption key with the authorized subscribers. The 264
data that is outsourced to a shared repository is always encrypted with that key. In the 265
subsequent descriptive details of the proposed system, the specifics of sharing data 266
within an untrusted domain are intentionally neglected for the sake of simplicity. 267
Readers can refer to [24] and [25] for descriptions of efficient and secure data sharing 268
within public cloud storage services. The proposed system address the problem of 269
privacy-aware relevant data access in untrusted cloud storage services. Ensuring data 270
integrity and correctness is beyond the scope of research undertaken in this work; 271
interested reader can refer to [26] for more details on public auditing. 272
Table 1 presents the notations used in the descriptive details of our proposed system 273
to semantically search the encrypted data. F represents a file that is outsourced to 274
cloud storage. I stands for an index computed over F that contains the keywords and 275
their respective frequencies i.e., I = {〈kw0, f0〉 . . . 〈kwn, fn〉}, where n is the size of the 276
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Fig 2. Semantic search over encrypted data - conceptual model
index. Is represents a semantic index that is generated by identifying synonyms and the 277
root word for each kw0...n : kwi ∈ I i.e., 278
Is = {〈kw0, syn00...ν , rw0, f0〉 . . . 〈kwn, synn0...ν , rwn, fn〉}, where syni0...ν is the list of 279
synonyms of kwi, and rwi is its root word. H is an encoding function that is publicly 280
known and encodes variable sized keywords into integer values of fixed length. EH and 281
DH are homomorphic encryption algorithms. σpk and σsk are public and secret keys 282
respectively, that are used by homomorphic encryption algorithms. These algorithms 283
enable the processing of encrypted values (search query and encrypted index) without 284
the need to decrypt them. ES and DS are symmetric encryption algorithms with a 285
secret key k. F and Is are encrypted with symmetric encryption algorithms before they 286
can be outsourced to a cloud server. EA and DA are asymmetric encryption algorithms 287
associated with kpub and kpri public and private keys, respectively. α0...n represents a 288
list of polynomial coefficients that are used to formulate an oblivious search query. 289
∆y0...n is a list of oblivious values that are obtained as a result of the oblivious search 290
query execution by the cloud server. 291
Proposed System 292
The proposed methodology of encrypted data search based on semantically enriched 293
index and search queries is presented in this section. It is divided into five cohesive 294
steps: indexing, data outsourcing, query formulation, query execution, and 295
post-processing of results. 296
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Table 1. Notations used in the descriptive detail of semantically enriched encrypted
data search.
Notation Description
F File outsourced to a shared repository.
I = {〈kw0, f0〉 . . . 〈kwn, fn〉} Index file that contains n keywords.
Is = {〈kw0, syn00...ν , rw0, f0〉 . . .
〈kwn, synn0...ν , rwn, fn〉}
Semantic index - an enriched form of I. kw is a keyword
from I, syn0...ν is a list of its synonyms and rw is its
root/parent word.
H Publicly known encoding function that transforms an
arbitrary-sized string to an integer value of q modulo,
where q is a large prime.
EH , DH Homomorphic encryption and decryption algorithms.
σpk, σsk Public and secret key pair for homomorphic encryption
algorithms.
EA, DA Asymmetric encryption and decryption algorithms.
kpub, kpri Public and private key pair for asymmetric encryption
algorithms.
ES , DS Symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms.
k Secret key of symmetric encryption algorithms. It is shared
with authorized users only.
α0...n List of coefficients of a polynomial P which defines a search
query.
∆y0...n List of oblivious values generated as a result of query
execution by the cloud server.
Indexing 297
A semantic search over encrypted data is achieved by evaluating search queries for an 298
enriched inverted index (Is) associated with the outsourced data (F). Since, we want 299
subscribers to search outsourced data using search queries that are semantically 300
equivalent, the inverted index (I) is augmented with extra information. This extra 301
information enables us to identify outsourced data that contains relevant information 302
instead of finding an exact match between the search query and the keywords extracted 303
from the outsourced data. 304
To achieve this, the indexing is further divided into two phases. In the first phase, 305
for each F that needs to be stored in cloud storage, I is generated. It contains all of the 306
keywords (kw0 . . . kwn) that appear in F , along with their respective frequencies i.e, 307
I = {〈kw0, f0〉, . . . 〈kwn, fn〉}. After that I is further processed to augment it with 308
semantic information. For that, kw0...n : kwi ∈ I are searched in a lexical database. 309
This enables us to identify synonyms (syn0...ν) of kwi that do not exist in I but where 310
syni0...ν and kwi semantically equivalent. Further root word (rwi) of each kwi is also 311
extracted from the lexical database. rw assists us in finding the keywords that share the 312
same root word, consequently identifying the relevancy between the search query and 313
the encrypted outsourced data. Once syn0...ν and rw are identified, I is augmented 314
with this extra information and is transformed into semantic index i.e., 315⊎
(I, syn0...ν , rw)→ Is; where
⊎
(·) is a function that appends syn0...ν and rw to I 316
removing any duplicate values, where 317
Is = {〈kw0, syn00...ν , rw0, f0〉 . . . 〈kwn, synn0...ν , rwn, fn〉}. 318
Data Outsourcing 319
To ensure that the cloud server cannot exploit Is by deducing confidential information 320
about the outsourced data. Is is concealed using a symmetric encryption algorithm 321
before it can be outsourced to a cloud server. The secret key (k) for the symmetric 322
encryption algorithm is shared among all of the authorized subscribers by the owner 323
who having ownership rights over the shared cloud based repository. The scope of this 324
paper is limited to encrypted data search, readers may refer to [27] for more details 325
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Fig 3. Encoding semantically enriched index and securing its confidentiality through
symmetric encryption.
secret key sharing and user revocation in untrusted domain. 326
In order to ensure that the search query can be obliviously evaluated by the cloud 327
server, the owner encodes each keyword (kwi ∈ Is) using a publiclly known encoding 328
function H(Is)→ Iˆs. Iˆs is then encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm 329
ES(Iˆs, k)→ Iˆks . Once the confidentiality of Is is ensured, Iˆks along with Fk are 330
outsourced to the cloud server. Since, k is only shared among the authorized subscribers 331
and the owner, unauthorized subscribers cannot deduce any information about the 332
outsourced data, even if they conspire with the cloud server. Fig 3 illustrates the entire 333
process of securing inverted index with symmetric encryption. 334
Query Formulation 335
To search encrypted data, a subscriber defines a search criterion (Ckw0...j ), which 336
consists of a set of keywords (kw0...j) that are used to search the relevant encrypted 337
outsourced data. Since, we want to realize a semantic search over encrypted data, the 338
search criteria defined by the subscriber is further enriched by identifying synonyms of 339
kw0...j : kwi ∈ Ckw0...j . Once the relevant keywords (syn0...ν) are identified Ckw0...j is 340
enriched by adding syn0...ν to Ckw0...j i.e.,
⊎
(Ckw0...j , syn0...ν)→ Ckw0...l , where j < l, 341
and
⊎
(·) is a function that appends syn0...ν to Ckw0...j . 342
Since, search queries are evaluated by the cloud server, there is a need to conceal 343
Ckw0...l using an appropriate symmetric encryption algorithm. To prevent the cloud 344
server from deducing any information about the encrypted outsourced data, the owner 345
encodes Ckw0...l using a publicly known encoding function. For example, 346
H(Ckw0...l)→ Cˆkw0...j - H(·) must be the same encoding function as that used in the 347
data outsourcing; otherwise, an oblivious search query cannot be successfully evaluated. 348
After that Cˆkw0...l is encrypted with the symmetric encryption i.e., 349
ES(Cˆkw0...l , k)→ Cˆkkw0...l , where k is a shared symmetric encryption key, which is the 350
same as that used in the data outsourcing to conceal Iˆkw0...n . 351
To this stage, Cˆkw0...l has been concealed, however in order to realize an oblivious 352
query evaluation there is a need to further process Cˆkkw0...l . A polynomial (P (x)) is 353
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Fig 4. Encoding semantically enriched search criteria and modeling search query for
oblivious computation.
defined such that the concealed kw0...n : kwi ∈ Cˆkkw0...l are the root of P (x) i.e., 354
P (x ∈ Cˆkkw0...l) =
∑l
i=0 αix
i = 0, where α0...l are the coefficients of P (x). 355
Once the polynomial P (x) has been defined, a homomorphic encryption key pair 356
(σpk, σsk) is initialized. Homomorphic encryption enables the cloud server to process the 357
encrypted search query and also restrains its ability to learn the result of the query 358
evaluation. After that, α0...l are encrypted i.e., EH(α0...l, σsk)→ ασsk0...l, ασsk0...l along with 359
σpk are transfered to the cloud server. α
σsk
0...l are used as the encrypted search query 360
whereas σpk enables the evaluation of an encrypted search query without the need to 361
decipher Iˆks and ασsk0...l. Fig 4 describes the entire process of query formation. 362
Query Execution 363
To semantically identify the encrypted data, the search query is obliviously executed by 364
the cloud server. ασsk0...l, which is submitted by a subscriber, is evaluated for Iˆks . By 365
using σpk, for kw0...n : kwi ∈ Iˆks , the cloud sever computes the oblivious value i.e., 366
∆y0...n = r.P (yi ∈ Iˆks ), where yi = kwi ∈ Iˆks and r is a random number. The 367
computation of the oblivious value ensures that the owner can identify the match 368
between ασsk0...l and Iˆks . Fig 4 describes the oblivious query execution process. 369
Since, we are employing homomorphic encryption, the cloud server cannot learn 370
whether kwi ∈ Iˆks is a root of ασsk0...l. Thus, it cannot identify a match between the 371
encrypted search criterion and the encrypted index. Once ∆y0...n = r.P (y0...n) are 372
computed, the cloud server transfers the result of the search query evaluation to the 373
subscriber. 374
Post-processing of results 375
The oblivious values that the subscriber receives from the cloud server can only be 376
deciphered using the valid homormophic key, which is the secret key, σsk. This ensures 377
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that the cloud server cannot collude with malicious subscribers to exploit the oblivious 378
query evaluation process. On receiving the cloud server’s response, the subscriber 379
deciphers ∆y0...n i.e., DH(∆0...n, σsk) = ψ0...n, where ψi can be a zero or non-zero 380
randomized value. 381
Since, the search query ασsk0...l submitted by the subscriber is constituted of root 382
values from Cˆkkw0...l the decryption of ψi turns out to be zero for all those yi = kwi ∈ Iˆks 383
that are equal to the root value of P (yi), i.e., kwi ∈ Cˆkkw0...l ∧ kwj ∈ Iˆkkw0...n where 384
kwj = kwi. For all other values where kwj 6= kwi, ψi would turn out to be a random 385
value (see the equation 1). 386
P (y) =
l∑
i=0
αiy
i
{
= 0 if y is root of P (y).
6= 0 a random value r for all other index entries. (1)
Thus, only by deciphering ∆y0...n with valid σsk owner can learn the result of 387
encrypted search query. However, for the cloud server the evaluation of the search query 388
will remain oblivious. 389
Implementation 390
The proposed methodology for a semantically enabled search of encrypted data is 391
realized using jdk 1.7. We implemented a Java based desktop application and web 392
service. The desktop application performs keyword extraction, indexing and search 393
query augmentation, and post-processing of the result, whereas the web service is solely 394
responsible for the oblivious evaluation of the encrypted search queries. Fig 5 illustrates 395
the core functionalities of desktop application (data owner and authorized users) and 396
web service. 397
In desktop application for data owner we generates an inverted index from the plain 398
text, i.e., the data that needs to be outsourced to cloud storage. For this, we employ 399
Apache Lucene API [28], which is a fully-featured text search engine that is focused on 400
high performance. Apache Lucene enables us to extract all keywords, avoiding indexing 401
of the stop word and repeated keywords. Once the keywords are extracted from the 402
plain text in the form of the inverted index, we augment them with semantic 403
information, i.e., synonyms and root words, using WordNet [29]. To use the augmented 404
keywords to search the encrypted data, a hash of the individual keywords is computed 405
using the SHA-512 hashing algorithm. The hashed keywords are then encoded into 406
BigInteger values of arbitrary size. Once encoded, the inverted index entries are 407
encrypted with the symmetric encryption algorithm and are outsourced to the web 408
service. 409
User desktop application authorized users model their search query in the form of a 410
polynomial and learn the semantic map between their search criteria and the outsourced 411
encrypted index. The search criteria defined by a user is augmented and encoded in a 412
similar way, as discussed for the inverted index. To evaluate the encrypted search query, 413
we utilize the Pascal Paillier cryptosystem [30]. The secret key of Pascal Paillier is used 414
to conceal the search criteria, whereas a public key is used by the cloud server to 415
evaluate the search query. For each encrypted keyword in the encrypted index, the 416
search is evaluated and the result is transmitted back to the user. 417
Evaluation 418
The proposed methodology for the encrypted data search was evaluated on a 2.60 GHz 419
Windows 7 PC with 2.0 GB of main memory. We opted for a relatively low-end 420
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Fig 5. Core functionalities - desktop application and web service.
machine to demonstrate that the proposed methodology can be realized for any public 421
cloud-based storage service, since it does not have any special computational 422
requirements. 423
In the subsequent section, we first present the computational complexity of the 424
semantic search for encrypted data. We then discuss the computational analysis of 425
augmenting the inverted index and the search criteria with the semantic information. In 426
the last section, we show the computational load of the oblivious query evaluation, 427
where the search query is composed of multiple search criteria. 428
Complexity Analysis 429
The computational complexity and the amount of data transmitted between the entities 430
are analyzed in order to illustrate the efficacy of our proposed encrypted data search. 431
Both of these parameters are directly proportional to the size of the encrypted index 432
outsourced to the cloud storage and the size of the encrypted search query. Table 2 433
shows the set of operations performed in each step of our proposed methodology, along 434
with the input size and the amount of transmitted data. For the sake of simplicity, we 435
regarded the cryptographic and hashing operations as constant time operations, because 436
the proposed methodology is not confined to any particular encryption or hashing 437
algorithm. 438
Indexing: To extract keywords and to identify the semantically equivalent words for 439
each extracted keyword, we utilize freely available libraries, such as Apache Lucene and 440
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Table 2. Complexity analysis of semantic search for encrypted data
Steps Operations Input Size Computational
Complexity
Transmitted
Values
Indexing Public encoding &
Symmetric encryp-
tion
N O(N) –
Data outsourcing – N O(N) N
Query formulation Asymmetric encryp-
tion & Polynomial
modeling
n O(n3) n+ 2
Query execution Polynomial evalua-
tion
(n+ 1)N O(n2.N) N
Post-processing of
results
Asymmetric decryp-
tion
N depends on n depends on n
Wordnet. Since these libraries complement our proposed system, we consider their 441
execution at a constant time. Thus, the computational complexity of the index is O(N), 442
where N is the size of the augmented index containing both the synonym and the root 443
word. 444
Data outsourcing: We regard the computational complexity of the data outsourcing 445
to be O(N), where N is the size of the augmented index. In total, N values are 446
transmitted to the cloud server. 447
Query formulation: The query formation is comprised of two steps. In the first 448
step, the user defines the search criteria, which is then expanded with semantic 449
information and finally encoded into a fixed length integer value using a hashing 450
algorithm. In the second step, encoded values are used to model a polynomial, which is 451
then concealed using the Pascal Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm. Since the 452
retrieval of the synonyms and root word and the encoding of the expanded search 453
criteria are regarded as constant time operations, the computational complexity of the 454
first step is O(n), where n is the size of the expanded search criteria. For the second 455
step, the first individual encoded search criterion is modeled as a polynomial (where the 456
search criterion is a root of the polynomial), the individual polynomials are multiplied 457
together, and the coefficients of the resultant polynomial are concealed with the private 458
key of the homomorphic encryption algorithm. Since the encrypted search query is 459
modeled in three steps, its computational complexity is O(n3), where n is the size of the 460
encoded search criteria. In total, n+ 2 values are transmitted to the cloud server, where 461
n+ 1 is the number of coefficients, and there is one public key of the homomorphic 462
encryption algorithm. 463
Query execution: The encrypted search query is evaluated for each encrypted entry 464
in the index outsourced to a cloud server. The computation complexity of the query 465
execution depends on two factors: the size of the index, N , and the size of the 466
polynomial that models the search query, n+ 1. Thus, the computational complexity of 467
an oblivious search query evaluation in terms of the Big-O notation can be expressed as 468
O(n2N). The size of search query results is also directly proportional to the size of the 469
index. In total, N values are transmitted to the user as a result of the search query 470
execution. 471
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Table 3. Computational time analysis of semantic search for encrypted data
Query Size
(No. of keywords)
Query formulation (ms) Query execution (ms)
2 238 245
4 411 791
6 590 1169
8 778 2811
10 982 4230
12 1187 6018
14 1405 8796
Post-processing of results: Post-processing of the results is relatively a simple 472
process, and it only deciphers the number of oblivious values, N , sent by the cloud 473
server. Since we consider the computational load of the cryptographic operations as a 474
constant, the computational complexity of the post-processing of the result can be 475
regarded as O(N). The computational time required to post-process an individual 476
oblivious record depends on size of search query i.e., number of keywords used to model 477
conjunctive search query. 478
Computational Analysis 479
The computational time required to enrich the inverted index and the search query with 480
semantic information is presented along with the amount of time required to model an 481
encrypted search query. We studied the computational time of conjunctive search 482
queries and presented the time required to evaluate those encrypted search queries over 483
the enriched inverted index. Table 3 shows the average computational time of the 484
aforementioned steps computed over 100 iterations. To measure computational time we 485
used Java time logging mechanism. System time to the precision of nanoseconds was 486
logged at the beginning and end of the process, difference between logged timestamps 487
was regarded as the time required to completely execute the process. 488
Synonym identification: The index and search query expansion are two important 489
steps which enable a semantic search over encrypted data. For the computational 490
analysis, we evaluated Wordnet API over a batch of 50 words. These words can be 491
regarded as keyword entries in the inverted index and search criteria defined by 492
authorized subscribers. For a batch, the total number of synonyms and the execution 493
time are noted first, and we extracted 872 synonyms in 408 ms. This total number of 494
synonyms is then divided by 50 to calculate the average number of synonyms per word, 495
which is approximately 18 synonyms per word. Finally, the time required to extract 496
these average synonyms per word is calculated as the total execution time divided by 497
the total time multiplied by the average number of synonyms per word, i.e., 498
(408/872) ∗ 18 = 8.42 ms, which represents the average execution time per word. This 499
exercise is repeated over 10 batches of different word sets for a more realistic time 500
calculation. For the evaluation, we selected the standard implementation of WordNet 501
and did not consider an optimization strategy. 502
Query formulation: The query formulation is comprised of the polynomial modeling 503
and the asymmetric encryption of polynomial coefficients. As discussed in the 504
complexity analysis, the computational cost of the query formulation depends upon the 505
size of the search criteria that constitutes the encrypted search query. Unlike the 506
conventional methodology, the proposed method supports a conjunctive search query, 507
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allowing authorized subscribers to set multiple search filters instead of relying on a 508
single search criterion. Table 3 shows the average computational cost to model an 509
encrypted search query with multiple search criteria. 510
Query execution: For each index entry (encrypted keyword), the cloud server 511
evaluates the search query. The query evaluation is merely a process of polynomial 512
evaluation at a certain value, and that value happens to be an individual keyword in the 513
outsourced enhanced index. The computational time of the query execution depends on 514
the size of the enhanced index and the encrypted search query. The entire process of 515
query execution utilizes the homomorphic property of the Pascal Paillier cryptosystem. 516
The result of the query execution is oblivious to the cloud server. The computational 517
time of the encrypted search query comprises a range of two to ten search criteria, as 518
shown in Table 3, which shows how the increase in the number of search criteria affects 519
the computational time required to obliviously execute a search query. 520
Security Analysis 521
In this section, we present the security analysis of our proposed methodology. 522
Particularly, we focus on the capabilities of malicious entities to learn the encrypted 523
search query and to deduce confidential information about the encrypted outsourced 524
data. We examine the advantage of an untrusted cloud service provider to learn the 525
result of the search query evaluation and to deduce information that can lead to a 526
potential loss of privacy. We then discuss the scenario in which an unauthorized 527
subscriber attempts to search encrypted data to which it does not have access. 528
The proposed methodology utilizes a number of cryptographic primitives to ensure 529
execution of the encrypted search queries and to restrain malicious entities from 530
deducing information that assists them in compromising the privacy of the outsourced 531
data. As illustrated in the descriptive details of our proposed methodology, the inverted 532
index is encrypted with symmetric encryption. To ensure oblivious evaluation of the 533
search queries, homomorphic encryption is utilized along with a private matching 534
protocol [31]. For the security analysis of these cryptographic primitives, readers can 535
refer to [30] and [32]. In the subsequent sections, we examine the capabilities of 536
malicious entities to deduce confidential information within the context of a semantic 537
search over encrypted data. 538
Malicious Cloud Server 539
The proposed methodology for encrypted data search utilizes the computational power 540
and storage facility of a cloud server to execute search queries, instead of relying on a 541
trusted third party. The cloud server uses an encrypted index Iˆks , that is comprised of 542
encrypted keywords. To compromise the privacy of the outsourced data, the cloud 543
server either has to decipher the inverted index or deduce information from the 544
evaluation of the encrypted search queries. In addition, the search queries are submitted 545
in an encrypted format (ασsk0...l), and are evaluated by using a private matching protocol 546
i.e., (P (y0...n ∈ Iˆωukw0...n) = ∆y0...n). Since, search queries are encrypted and the result of 547
query evaluation is oblivious to the cloud server, the cloud server cannot learn any 548
information about the keywords concealed in the search query. 549
In order to compromise the privacy of the outsourced data, the cloud server needs 550
access to the secret key, k, which is shared by the repository owner. Once the cloud 551
server has access to the secret key it can effortlessly decipher the keywords that 552
comprises the inverted index. However, only authorized subscribers have access to the 553
secret key as it is encrypted with their respective public key (ω
kpub
ui ). Thus, for a cloud 554
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server the computational complexity to compromise the privacy of the outsourced is 555
equivalent to that of asymmetric encryption. However, even if the cloud server manages 556
to gain access to the secret key it can only decipher the encrypted keywords that are 557
associated with the outsourced data - so that confidentialitly of the outsourced data is 558
preserved as it is encrypted with a symmetric encryption key, which is only 559
disseminated to authorized subscribers. Since our proposed methodology deals with the 560
encrypted data search, the topic of authorized data access is beyond its scope. 561
Malicious Subscriber 562
The proposed methodology of encrypted data search not only realizes encrypted search 563
in untrusted domain it also tackles the problem of unauthorized data search by 564
malicious users. It ensures that unauthorized subscribers are not able to deduce any 565
information about the encrypted outsourced data by simply learning the presence or 566
absence of keywords. It does provide protection against conspired attacks by 567
unauthorized subscribers and untrusted cloud server. Since, encrypted index is 568
concealed with secret key that is only shared amongst authorized collaborating 569
subscribers, malicious subscriber can not successfully evaluate their search query. 570
To search the encrypted data, the search criteria (Ckw0...l) is concealed with a secret 571
key i.e., ES(Cˆkw0...l , k) = Cˆkkw0...l . Once concealed it is then used to the model search 572
query, which is comprised of the encrypted coefficients ασsk0...l, of polynomial 573
P (x ∈ Cˆkkw0...l). 574
Since, only authorized subscribers have secret keys, search queries from unauthorized 575
subscribers cannot be evaluated successfully. Also, unauthorized subscribers cannot 576
intercept valid search query to modify the search criteria. This is because unauthorized 577
subscriber does have valid secret key to model new or a part of valid search request. 578
The concealed search criteria are only comparable with the encrypted index if the 579
search criteria are also encrypted with the same key. Even if unauthorized subscribers 580
collude with the cloud server, the execution of unauthorized search queries cannot assist 581
them in learning any useful information. The search criterion encrypted with the 582
arbitrary secret key is not compatible with the concealed inverted index, i.e., 583
Cˆk?kw0...l /∈ Iˆkkw0...n . Thus, for unauthorized subscribers, it is computationally infeasible to 584
deduce any information that can lead to the potential loss of data privacy. 585
Conclusion and Future Directions 586
This paper addresses the problem of privacy-aware data search within the untrusted 587
domain of a cloud service provider. It proposes an index-based privacy-aware data 588
search methodology which can identify a semantic match between encrypted data and 589
search criteria. Unlike the conventional methodology, the proposed privacy-aware data 590
search leverages authorized subscribers to access relevant data by defining conjunctive 591
search queries without relying on any trapdoors defined by the data owner. It realizes 592
an oblivious data search, which ensures that the cloud service provider can only assist in 593
the execution of encrypted search queries; however, the CSP can not learn or deduce 594
confidential information from the execution of the search query, which can lead to the 595
potential loss of data privacy. The security analysis demonstrated that, for malicious 596
subscribers and untrusted cloud service providers, the proposed methodology always 597
generates a randomized response that restrains them from learning of the presence or 598
absence of a particular keyword in the outsourced encrypted data. Since the proposed 599
methodology is an index-based data search, it does not have a requirement to encrypt 600
the outsourced data with a particular encryption algorithm. The encryption of 601
outsourced data with an arbitrary encryption algorithm does not affect the operation of 602
PLOS 17/20
the proposed methodology. The computational analysis shows that the proposed 603
methodology exerts a reasonable computational load on authorized subscribers to model 604
their encrypted search queries. 605
So far, the proposed methodology can only identify exact matches between the 606
extended search criteria and the inverted index. In the future, we plan to include 607
wildcard-enabled search queries, which can be used to match a substring while ensuring 608
oblivious execution and privacy-awareness of search queries. 609
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